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on the labor supply of single mothers with very young children. The reform aimed at 
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Survey, the analysis shows that single mothers affected by the reform had experienced a 
significant increase in their employment rate four years after the reform was 
implemented. During the same period, the employment rate of married mothers with 
young children did not experience a significant change, suggesting that at least part of 
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in getting single moms back to work, even in the presence of very young children. 
 
Keywords: Single mothers, labor supply, welfare benefits. 
 
JEL Codes: I38, J21, H53.
                                                 
♦ Email at: libertad.gonzalez@upf.edu. Mailing address: Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Departamento de 
Economía y Empresa, Ramón Trias Fargas, 25-27, 08005  Barcelona, Spain. Phone: (34) 93 542 2610. 
Fax: (34) 93 542 1746.  
* I thank CREST for the use of their facilities during the winter of 2004, and participants at the centrA 
seminar in Seville for their comments. All remaining errors are mine.     1   
1. Introduction 
Single mother families have received a great deal of attention from researchers and 
policy makers in recent years. This is partly attributable to the large increases in the 
prevalence of this type of family that have taken place in some Western countries during 
the past few decades. Some of the questions raised by the increasing prevalence of this 
non-traditional family type regard the conflicting role of women as mothers and 
breadwinners.  
  Western countries differ greatly in the extent to which single mothers participate in 
the labor market. In the mid-1990s, 27 percent of single mothers in the United Kingdom 
reported working at least 10 hours a week, compared with 76 percent in the United 
States and 72 percent in France.
1 Single mothers out of work are more likely to be poor 
and dependent on public support. On the other hand, the effects of maternal 
employment on children are still not well understood. Higher income in the household 
is associated with positive outcomes for children,
2 but lack of maternal care and parental 
supervision is thought to affect children and adolescents negatively.
3 In any case, 
understanding what drives the labor supply decisions of single mothers under different 
environments would help inform policies aimed at preventing and alleviating poverty 
for these particularly vulnerable families.  
  This paper looks into the effects of benefit systems on the labor supply of single 
mothers by analyzing the effect of a reform of the French single parents allowance that 
was meant to encourage single mothers with very young children to work by 
introducing a temporary earnings top-up schedule.  
                                                 
1 Estimates from Luxembourg Income Study data, Wave IV.  
2 See Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (1997), Mayer (1997), McLoyd (1998). 
3 The literature on the effects of maternal employment on children is mixed. Some have found negative 
effects of maternal employment when children are young (Ruhm 2004, Harvey 1999). Others find that 
maternal employment has positive effects on children in low-income families (Moore et al. 1996, Zaslow 
and Emig 1997).  2
  Other previous studies that have looked into the effect of taxes and benefits on the 
labor supply of single mothers have focused on the US (Meyer and Rosembaum 2000, 
2001, Eissa et al. 2004) and the UK (Gregg and Harkness 2003, Ermish and Wright 
1991, Jenkins 1992). The expansions of the EITC in the US have been shown to induce 
more single mothers to join the labor market, suggesting that single mothers’ 
employment rates are responsive to financial incentives.
4 However, this is a very 
different program from the one we are considering in that it is strictly an earnings 
supplement, so that a woman is eligible only if she works, as opposed to the French 
single parents allowance, which guarantees a minimum level of income independently 
of employment status. Other studies have analyzed the effect of welfare reform in the 
1990’s on the labor supply of single mothers in the US and the UK, but the large 
number of reforms going on at the same time makes it hard to identify the effect of 
specific policy changes.
5 
  The effect of financial incentives on the labor supply of married mothers has 
received some attention in France in recent years, particularly following a reform in 
family policy in 1994 that was meant to encourage mothers to stop working after the 
birth of their second child. The reform was followed by a sharp decline in activity and 
employment for eligible married mothers (Afsa 1996, Piketty 1998, 2002). Little 
attention has been paid, however, to single mother families, who were not affected by 
that reform. Other related work has evaluated the financial incentives to work created by 
the French minimum income guarantee (RMI). Gurgand and Margolis (2001, 2005) 
show that the gains from employment are low for single mother families compared with 
non-employment and RMI recipiency. Piketty (1998) also suggests that the introduction 
of the RMI in 1988 instituted significant disincentives to work for single mothers.  
                                                 
4 See, for instance, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001). 
5 See, for instance, Gregg and Harkness (2003), who find that the employment of single mothers rose by 5 
percentage points over a 10 year period as a result of the reforms. 3
  There is thus some evidence that financial incentives can successfully induce 
mothers of very young children to leave the labor force. This paper analyses how 
successfully financial incentives can be used to encourage single moms to return to paid 
employment.  
  France experienced a pronounced increase in the prevalence of single mother 
families in recent years. The number of single mother families as a proportion of all 
families with children rose from 9.6% in 1990 to 13.8% in 2002.
6 According to a recent 
study (CERC 2004), children in single mother households in France are much more 
likely to be poor than those in two parent families. In 2000, almost 15% of children 
living with a single mother were poor, compared with less than 8% of all children. 
  Most of French single mothers participate in the labor market. In 1994, 86 percent 
of single mothers were either working or looking for a job in France. Activity rates of 
French single mothers are amongst the highest in Europe. However, during the high 
unemployment period in the late 1990’s, activity and employment rates fell 
significantly. In 1999, 63.7 percent of single mothers were working, compared with 
70.3 percent in 1993. The trend may have started to reverse since then.    
  Single mothers in France are entitled to several different allowances, depending on 
the size of the family, the ages of the children, and the level of income. The French 
single parents allowance (Allocation de Parent Isolé or API) guarantees single mothers 
with at least one child under the age of 3 a minimum income level. In 2003, an eligible 
single mother with two children was entitled to a monthly allowance of 870 euros if she 
received no other income. Up until January 1999, labor income was taxed at 100%, i.e., 
an extra euro of earnings was accompanied by a reduction of one euro in the allowance 
received.  
                                                 
6 Estimates from the French Employment Survey. 4
  The single parents allowance was reformed in 1998 to allow women to accumulate 
labor earnings with full perception of the allowance for a limited period of time. From 
January 1999 on, a woman on API who started working for pay could keep the full API 
amount on top of her earnings for up to 6 months, and then for 9 extra months labor 
earnings would be taxed at 50%. A single mother with two children who started 
working at the minimum wage before the reform would make around 13,000 euros in 
the first year (in 2003 euros), which would raise her above the income guaranteed by the 
API, thus she would not receive any allowance. After the reform, she would receive an 
extra 7,160 euros of API during that first year of work, thus increasing her income by 
55 percent. 
  The longitudinal nature of the data allows us to compare the evolution of 
employment rates for single mothers affected by the reform with that of other mothers 
of similar characteristics. The analysis shows that the reform was followed by a 
significant increase in employment rates for single mothers affected by the reform. This 
increase was significantly higher than the change experienced by married mothers with 
very young children. The increase in employment rates seemed to take place through a 
rise in full time work, and it was driven by young, low-educated single mothers. The 
effect appeared to persist four years after the reform. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution of 
the activity and employment rates of single mothers in France since 1990, and provides 
a short description of the French benefit system, focusing on the provisions that are 
more relevant to single mother families. The following section describes the data and 
the main variables, and introduces the methodology. I use data from the French 
Employment Survey from 1995 to 2002. Section 4 reports the results of estimating the 5
effect of the 1998 reform on the employment and activity rates of single mothers, and 
section 5 concludes. 
  
2. Single Mothers and Work in France 
2.1 Employment and Participation Rates 
Figure 1 shows employment and activity rates for all women and single mothers (aged 
18 to 55) in France, from 1990 to 2002. Single mothers were more likely to participate 
and more likely to be employed than other women during the whole period.
7 In the first 
half of the 1990s, between 67 and 70 percent of single mothers reported being employed 
(versus 58 to 60 percent of all women). However, employment rates declined steadily 
for single mothers from 1993 to 1999. The 70.3 percent employment rate of 1993 had 
become 63.7 percent in 1999.  
A similar trend can be observed for activity rates. In 1994, 86.2 percent of single 
mothers were working or looking for a job, compared with only 80.5 in 2001. After 
1999, the employment rate of single mothers seemed to increase until the end of the 
period. Activity rates also seemed to pick up in 2002. Note that the 1994-98 period 
coincided with high unemployment rates in France (around 12 percent), which declined 
significantly after 1998 (reaching less than 9 percent in 2001).  
 
2.2 The French Benefit System and Incentives to Work 
The French “single parent allowance” (API) was created in 1976 to provide support for 
single parents while they had at least one child younger than 3 years of age or right after 
a separation or divorce. Thus a single mother can receive the allowance for as long as 
                                                 
7 This is not the case in other countries. For a study of the determinants of participation of single mothers 
across countries, see Gonzalez (2004). 6
three years.
8 It is a means-tested allowance, so that the amount received is the difference 
between the “guaranteed” income level and other income in the household (including 
other allowances). Labor earnings are thus taxed at 100%. The guaranteed amount 
varies with the number of children. In 2003, the guaranteed monthly amount for a single 
mother with one child was 695 euros, plus 174 per additional child.
9  
The API was reformed in 1998 (Law 98-657) with the explicit goal of encouraging 
participation. A single mother on API could, starting January 1999, start working and 
accumulate labor earnings and the whole API amount for 3 to 6 months.
10 After that 
initial period, labor earnings would be taxed at 50% during the 9 following months. 
Following this period, labor earnings would be taxed at 100%, just like they were before 
the reform. Thus the reform increases effective wage for as long as 15 months.
11 
The law 98-657, whose explicit goal was to fight “exclusions”, included other 
measures intended to improve the employability of vulnerable segments of the 
population, such as the young, the old, the long-term unemployed, and welfare 
recipients. These included personalized measures of orientation and training and some 
incentives for employers who hired workers in those groups at risk of exclusion.  
 There are of course other benefits apart from the API that may be available to single 
mothers in certain situations. All families with at least 2 children under 18 years of age 
in France are eligible for a universal family benefit, which varies with number and age 
of the children. In 2003, a family with 2 children under 11 received 111 euros a month. 
Families with at least 3 children over 3 years of age were also eligible for a means-
tested  “income supplement” (145 euros a month in 2003). There is also a means-tested 
                                                 
8 The time limit is 12 months if the youngest child is older than 3.  
9 In 2003, minimum wage for a full-time job was 1,090 euros. 
10 The API amount that a family receives is evaluated every three months. The duration of the period 
during which labor earnings do not reduce the allowance received depends on the exact timing of the 
woman’s activity with respect to the quarterly evaluations. 
11 In fact, under some conditions, if a single mother loses her job after that period, she can qualify again 
for the earnings top-up once she finds another job. 7
housing allowance that helps pay for rent. Finally, the minimum income guarantee 
(RMI), introduced in 1988, is a means-tested benefit that guarantees a minimum level of 
income, as a function of the composition of the household. Its amount is considerably 
lower than that of API.
12 The amount of these other benefits has not changed 
significantly in real terms during the 1990-2002 period. However, it is important to take 
them into account when evaluating the effect of the API on the employment rates of 
single mothers. 
Since the 1998 API reform increased expected income if working for pay while not 
affecting income if a single mother does not work, in a static framework the expected 
effect of the reform is to increase participation and employment amongst eligible single 
mothers.
13 From a more dynamic point of view, the effect of the reform is equivalent to 
an anticipated wage increase. The literature on intertemporal labor supply suggests that 
an anticipated wage shock would result in an increase in labor supply, since it would 
generate only a substitution effect.
14 This contrasts with the effect of a permanent or 
unanticipated wage shock, which would result in conflicting income and substitution 
effect that may cancel each other out.  
In order to illustrate the financial incentives to work created by the benefit system, it 
will be useful to compare the benefits to which a single mother is entitled if she does not 
work for pay versus expected benefits in the employment scenario, both before and after 
the reform.  
The level of benefits is essentially a function of the number of children, their ages, 
and other income. For simplicity, let us assume that there is no other income in the 
                                                 
12 There are other benefits available to families with children, but their relevance for single mother 
families is extremely limited (APE, APJE, etc). There are also the parental leave and child care 
provisions, which did not change significantly during the period. 
13 Although the effect on hours for those already working is uncertain, due to conflicting income and 
substitution effects in the intensive margin. 
14 See, for instance, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), pages 19-27. See also Card (1994) for a critical 
assessment of the intertemporal labor supply model. 8
household apart from the mother’s labor earnings and benefits. Thus, if a woman is not 
working, the level of benefits depends only on the number of children and their ages. If 
there are children under the age of 3, the woman is entitled to the API.
15 If they are all 
over 3, she can still qualify for the RMI. The guaranteed monthly amounts as a function 
of the number of children, in 1997 francs, can be found in Table 1. I show the RMI 
guarantee as well as the API for the sake of comparison, as many single mothers not 
eligible for API are on RMI.
16  A single mother with 2 children would be entitled to 
5,271 francs a month if at least one of her children was under 3 years of age (the API 
guarantee), and 4,325 otherwise (the RMI guarantee). 
The next step is to calculate benefit entitlement if working. But benefits are a 
function of earnings. Thus I show benefit entitlement for different earnings levels.  In 
1997 francs, average monthly earnings for working single mothers were 7,490 francs.
17 
The median was 6,476.
18  
a) Benefits if working, before the reform 
Benefit entitlement is calculated at 5 different levels of earnings.
19 Now the benefits 
include not only API or RMI, but also the universal family benefit and the family 
supplement, in those cases in which the family qualifies and is not eligible for API/RMI 
(or its amount is lower than the family allowances). Table 2a) shows benefit levels for a 
single mother with children under 3 who starts working, for five different levels of 
earnings. Note that, before the reform, and except for the lowest earnings category, a 
single mom who started working would be above the API guarantee, and therefore 
would be eligible only for the universal family benefit. 
                                                 
15 She is also eligible for the RMI, but its guaranteed amount is lower. 
16 The tables shows the API guarantee and the RMI guarantee. Other allowances received must be 
subtracted from the API/RMI amount so that the level of benefits received would not change. 
17 The minimum wage for a full-time job in 1997 was 6,664 francs. 
18 Percentile 25 was 4,867 francs; percentile 75 was 8,548 francs. 
19 3,000 francs a month, 5,000, 6,664 (the minimum wage for a full time job), 8,000 and 10,000. 9
A simple comparison between tables 1 and 2a) shows that benefit entitlement is 
considerably reduced when working. A single mother with 2 children, at least one under 
3 years of age, working at the minimum wage, would be entitled to 675 francs a month 
in benefits, versus 5,271 if she was not working. 
The RMI recipients could benefit from an earnings top-up program (intéressement), 
which allowed for partial accumulation of earnings and benefits during the first 750 
hours of work.
20 Table 3a) shows benefit entitlement during the first year of work, for 
different earnings levels, in 1997 francs. Note that benefit levels if working are higher 
for RMI recipients than for API recipients in some cases. For single mothers with at 
least 3 children this is due to the family supplement, only available to families with 3 or 
more children, all over the age of 3. For families with less than 3 children, this is 
attributable to the earnings top-up program.
21 In our sample, 3.7 percent of single 
mothers eligible for API were in fact receiving RMI during the 1995-1998 period 
(versus 15.5 percent of single mothers not eligible for API). 
b) Benefits if working, after the reform 
In 1998 the API allowance was reformed to allow women to accumulate labor earnings 
with full perception of the allowance. From January 1999 on, a woman on API who 
started working for pay could keep the full API amount on top of her earnings for up to 
6 months, and then for 9 extra months earnings would be taxed at 50%. After that initial 
period, earnings would be taxed at 100%. The reform did not affect the guaranteed 
amounts, thus benefits if not working remained unchanged. The change in benefit 
eligibility during the first year of work, by earnings level, can be seen in table 2b). 
                                                 
20 Before 1999, an RMI recipient who started working could subtract only 50% of her earnings from the 
RMI guarantee for the first 750 hours of work (about 5 months). 
21 Note, however, that in order to benefit from the RMI earnings top-up program one had to be on RMI 
before taking up employment, thus being subject to the lower guaranteed amount. 10
After January 1999, a single mother with 2 children (at least one of them under 3) 
who started working at the minimum wage would expect to receive (still in 1997 francs) 
3,605 francs a month during the first year of work,
22 compared with just 675 before the 
reform. This represents a 40 percent increase in expected income if working. The 
percent increase in income after the reform varies with earnings and number of children. 
For women working at the minimum wage, the increase ranges from 35 to 40 percent 
depending on the number of children, while its size is between 11 and 18 percent for 
wages around 10,000 francs a month. 
What happened with single mothers not eligible for API? As mentioned, the RMI 
already allowed for partially accumulating labor earnings with benefits for a certain 
amount of time.
23 The new rules for the API also applied to the RMI starting in January 
1999,
24 so that a single mother with 2 children (all of them older than 3) who started 
working at the minimum wage would expect to receive (in 1997 euros) 2,659 euros a 
month during the first year,
25 compared with 808 before the reform (see table 3b). This 
represents a 25 percent increase in expected income if working. The percent increase 
now ranges from 14 to 27 percent for women working at the minimum wage. 
In sum, after January 1999, benefits if not working remained unchanged for all 
single mothers, while benefits if working increased for the first year of work,
26 and this 
increase was more pronounced for single mothers eligible for API. Table 4 shows the 
increase in (monthly) benefits during the first year of work, for single mothers eligible 
versus not eligible for the API, working at the minimum wage, in 1997 francs. A single 
mother with 3 children, at least one of them under 3, experienced an increase of 3,120 
                                                 
22 Calculated as benefits during the first 12 months divided by 12 months. 
23 See footnote 20.  
24 I.e., possibility of perceiving the whole benefit amount for the first 3 to 6 months of work, then 50% of 
earnings subtracted from the guaranteed amount for 9 more months. 
25 Again, calculated as benefits during the first 12 months divided by 12 months. 
26 More precisely, for the first 12 to 15 months. 11
francs a month after the reform, compared with a 1,435 increase for single mothers not 
eligible for API after the reform.  
In 2002 euros, single mothers eligible for API experienced an increase in expected 
benefits during the first year of work (if working at the minimum wage) that was 
between 1,410 and 3,820 euros higher (depending on the number of children) than the 
increase experienced by single mothers not eligible for API. The increase in benefits for 
RMI recipients was however still sizeable.
 27 
Starting 1999, thus, there were stronger financial incentives to work for all single 
mothers, but especially for those eligible for API. This suggests that, everything else the 
same, single mothers should be more likely to work after the reform.
28 Moreover, we 
expect the increase in the likelihood of working to be higher for those women eligible 
for API under the new rules, compared with those not eligible.   
 
3. Data and Methodology 
The data set used in the estimation is the French Employment Survey (Enquête Emploi 
or EE), years 1990 through 2002. The EE is a nationally representative yearly survey of 
approximately 75,000 households. Detailed information on household composition and 
employment status is collected. Each household is interviewed three consecutive years.   
  The sample is limited to single mother families where the mother is between 18 and 
55 years of age. Single mother families are defined as households headed by a female 
                                                 
27 Note that some additional measures were also implemented to improve the employability of welfare 
recipients (both RMI and API). 
28 Note that, when evaluating the effect of the reform on participation, the increase in benefits should be 
measured “net” of the fixed costs of working, such as childcare costs. The empirical specification should 
thus take into account the fact that these fixed costs may vary with characteristics of the household. This 
issue is discussed in detail in section 3.  12
and containing only the mother and her dependent children under 18 years of age.
29 The 
variables used to identify single mother households are “type of household” and 
“number of children under 18”. A woman is characterized as employed, unemployed or 
inactive following the recoded variable “activity” in the survey. The analysis will focus 
on the period 1995-2002 (four years before and four years after the reform). 
  The number of single mothers in the sample is 22,954. Overall, 65 percent of them 
are employed. The employment rate is however much lower for single mothers with 
children under the age of 3 (eligible for API). Only 51 percent of them are active, and 
their employment rate is 32 percent. 
  Single mothers who had at least one child under the age of 3 after December 1998 
were affected by the reform. The French Employment Survey interviews each 
household three consecutive years. I thus define the “treated” group as those women 
who qualified for the new rules in at least one of the three interviews.
30 The longitudinal 
nature of the data allows us to observe at least some of these women before the reform 
took place. Thus we can compare the behavior of the treated group, before and after, 
with that of a “comparison” group. I define the comparison group as women who were 
eligible for the single parents allowance at some point during the four pre-reform years, 
but not after, i.e. they were not affected by the post-reform API rules.
31 For instance, a 
single mother whose youngest child turned 3 in December 1998 (and who had no 
subsequent child) was not affected by the new rules, and thus belongs in the comparison 
group. A single mother whose child turned 3 in June 1999 would have been eligible for 
the API under the new rules for 6 months, and thus belongs in the treatment group. 
                                                 
29 Unmarried women with children who live with the grandparents of the children are excluded from the 
sample since they cannot be identified in the data. Cohabiting couples with children are not counted as 
single mother families. 
30 I.e., women aged 18 to 55 who were single mothers and had a child under the age of 3 at the time of an 
interview that took place after January 1999. 
31 I.e., women aged 18 to 55 who were single mothers and had a child under the age of 3 at the time of an 
interview that took place before January 1999, but not after January 1999. 13
  The following probit model for the probability that a woman i in group j (treatment 
or comparison) and period t (before or after the reform), is employed (active) is 
estimated: 
(1)   ) ( ) 1 ( ijt t j t j ijt ijt d d d d X Y P ε λ γ α β + + + + Φ = =  
Where Y is a dummy that takes value 1 if a single mother is employed (active), Φ is the 
normal cumulative distribution function, X is a vector of individual characteristics, dj  is 
a dummy that takes value 1 if the woman belongs to the treatment group, dt is a dummy 
that indicates the period after the reform, and dj dt is the interaction of the two (taking 
value 1 for treated single mothers, after the reform). Thus α measures the difference in 
the pre-reform employment rates of the treatment and the comparison group, γ gives us 
the change in employment for the comparison group after the reform, and λ measures 
the change in employment for the treatment group relative to the comparison group.  
In the vector X, I include age of the woman, age squared, age cubed, education 
level,
32 marital status of the woman,
33 and a dummy for cities with more than 200,000 
inhabitants. Also included are dummies for number of children and dummies for 
children under 3 and under 6 years of age (the omitted category being no children born). 
These are meant to capture how the fixed costs of working vary with the number and 
ages of the children. Childcare costs, for instance, are expected to increase with the 
number of children and to decrease with their age (childcare is free for children aged 3 
or older). For this reason, specifications will also be estimated that allow the effect of 
the reform to vary with the number of children. 
                                                 
32 Both years of education and dummies for vocational training, high school graduation and university 
diploma. 
33 Never married, divorced, separated or widowed. 14
A set of year dummies is also included in the regressions. The omitted years are 
1998 (the last year before the reform) and 2002 (four years after), so that dt captures the 
change in employment four years after the reform with respect to the year before. 
For the comparison group to be valid, we need to assume that both groups of single 
mothers would have followed a similar path over time in the absence of the reform. 
However, single mothers not eligible for API were still eligible for RMI, which was 
also reformed in 1998 in order to encourage participation, although to a smaller extent, 
as we argued in section 2. In our data, 15.5 percent of single mothers not eligible for 
API were receiving the RMI before 1999.
34 Thus the differential change in employment 
between the two groups can only be interpreted as a lower bound on the effect of the 
API reform. 
As an alternative comparison group that is less likely to be affected by the RMI 
reform, I propose using married mothers with at least one child under the age of 3 at the 
time of one of the interviews. Only 0.5% of them were on RMI between 1994 and 
1998.
35 The activity and employment rates of married mothers with children under 3 
was, however, higher than for single mothers in the treatment or comparison group. In a 
period of increasing participation, we expect that the group that starts from a higher 
employment rate would possibly grow at a slower rate in percentage terms. Thus the 
increase in employment rates for single mothers affected by the reform, relative to 
married mothers with very young children, could be interpreted as an upper bound for 
the true effect of the reform. 
 
 
                                                 
34 There was no significant change after 1999 in the number of single mothers who were RMI recipients. 
35 0.8% during the 1999-2002 period. 15
4. Estimating the Effect of the Reform 
4.1   Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5 shows some descriptive statistics for single mothers in the treatment and 
comparison groups. There are 1,928 single mothers in the treatment group and 1,587 in 
the comparison group, while there are 36,018 married mothers in the sample. 
  Note that single mothers in the comparison and treatment groups are very similar in 
almost all respects. The employment rate of single mothers who were affected by the 
reform was 37 percent (their activity rate was 53 percent), compared with 35 percent for 
the comparison group (and a 57 percent activity rate). Both groups of women are 31 
years old on average, they have 13 years of education, about 27 percent have a 
vocational degree while only 5 to 6 percent have a university degree, almost half of 
them live in a city, and their distributions of number of children look strikingly 
similar.
36 The similarity of both groups of women supports the assumption that they 
would have behaved similarly in the absence of the reform.  
  As for married mothers, they are slightly older (32 years old, on average) and more 
educated than the treatment group. More than 47 percent of married mothers in the 
sample have a high school degree or some university education, versus only 29 percent 
of treated single mothers. Married mothers are also more likely to have several kids. 
Finally, the activity and employment rates or married mothers (62 and 54 percent, 
respectively) are significantly higher than for the treated group. 
 
4.2 Baseline Specification 
Table 6 (columns 1 and 2) displays the results from estimating equation 1 with the 
sample of single mothers. The first specification does not include the year dummies, 
                                                 
36 Note that about 10 percent of single mothers in the sample do not have a child under the age of 6 
present. Those observations correspond to interviews that took place before the birth of the child. 16
while the second one does. The coefficient on dj gives us the difference in employment 
rates between the treatment and comparison groups before the reform, while dt gives us 
the change in employment for single moms not affected by the reform. The coefficient 
on dj dt gives us the difference-in-difference estimate of the change in employment for 
treated single moms, relative to the comparison group. 
  Most of the controls are significant at the 99% confidence level. The age and 
education variables are strongly significant and have the expected signs.
37 Older, more 
educated single mothers are more likely to be employed. More children in the 
household and younger children are significantly associated with a lower probability of 
working. Unmarried mothers are less likely to work than divorced or separated mothers. 
Living in a city is associated with higher employment probabilities. Only two of the 
year dummies are significant.
38 
  The coefficient for treated single mothers (dj) is negative and significant at the 90% 
confidence level, indicating that the treatment group was less likely to be employed than 
the comparison group before the reform, once we account for differences in 
characteristics and year effects. The indicator for after the reform (dt) is positive but not 
significant, implying that the employment rate of single mothers in the comparison 
group did not increase significantly after 1998.  
  The employment rate of single mothers affected by the reform had increased by 7 to 
10 percentage points four years after the reform, and this increase was significant.
39 
However, it was not significantly higher than the increase for single mothers not 
                                                 
37 Age cubed, although not shown in the table, is included in the regressions and strongly significant.  
38 The dummy for 1996 is significantly negative at the 90% confidence level, while the dummy for 1999 
is significantly negative at the 95% confidence level. 
39 The absolute increase in the employment rate of treated single mothers equals the coefficients for dt 
plus dj dt. The sum of both coefficients is significantly positive at the 90% confidence level in the first 
specification, and at the 95% in the second. 17
affected by the API reform (since dj d t gets positive coefficients, but they are not 
significant).  
  The same set of regressions is estimated using activity rather than employment as 
the dependent variable (columns 3 and 4).
40 The activity rate of the treatment group was 
lower than for the comparison group. The increase in the activity rate of single mothers 
not affected by the reform (dt) was not significantly different from zero, and treated 
single mothers did not experience a significant differential increase. Thus, after the 
reform,  activity rates did not increase significantly for either the treatment or the 
comparison group, while treated single mothers increased their employment rate, but not 
significantly more than the comparison group. 
  As mentioned in section 3, the differential increase in employment and activity rates 
between the two groups of single mothers can only be interpreted as a lower bound for 
the effect of the API reform, given that the RMI was also reformed at the same time. 
Thus we propose using married mothers with very young children as an additional 
comparison group, less likely to be affected by the RMI rules. Equation 1 is then 
expanded to include two dj dummies, one indicating all single mothers (j=1), and a 
second dummy for the treated group (j=2). There are now two interaction terms, one 
indicating single mothers after the reform (dj=1 d t), and the other for treated single 
mothers after the reform (dj=2 d t). The first interaction term gives us the differential 
change in employment for single mothers not affected by the API reform relative to 
married mothers. The second one indicates the change in employment for treated single 
mothers, relative to single mothers in the comparison group. The results from this 
specification are presented in table 7. 
                                                 
40 None of the year dummies are significant in the regression for activity rates. 18
  The results show that treated single mothers experienced a significant increase in 
their employment rates of about 8 percentage points. This increase was significantly 
higher than the change for married mothers with very young children.
41 It was also 4 to 
6 points higher than the increase for single mothers in the comparison group, but this 
difference was not significant. As for activity rates, they did not change significantly for 
the treated group, neither in absolute terms, nor relative to the comparison groups. 
  In sum, the estimated effect of the API reform, four years after its implementation, 
was a significant increase in the employment rate of affected single mothers, both in 
absolute terms and relative to married mothers in the comparison group, while there was 
no significant increase in activity rates. The size of the increase in the employment rate 
of treated single mothers was between 9 and 10 percentage points, relative to married 
mothers with very young children. However, the increase in employment was not 
significantly higher for the treated group compared with single mothers in the 
comparison group. 
 
4.3 Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks 
Some alternative specifications have been estimated, including separate 
regressions by education level and by age, some additional interaction terms, and 
regressions that estimate separately the effect of the reform on part and full time 
work.
42 I also estimate specifications that aim at distinguishing between short and 
long term effects of the reform.  
  So far it has been assumed that the effect of the reform was common for all single 
mothers. However, if expected wages differ across women, then the potential effect of 
                                                 
41 The diff-in-diff estimate for the change in the employment rate of treated single mothers relative to 
married mothers equals the coefficient for dj=2 dt, plus the one for dj=1 dt. 
42 Regression results are available upon request. 19
the reform would differ as well. Take, for example, a single mother who started working 
after the reform and earned 5,000 francs a month (in 1997 francs). She would enjoy a 
total income between 50 and 60% higher (depending on the number of children) than 
she would have in the absence of the reform, during her first 12 months of work. 
However, the increase in income attributable to the reform would be between 20 and 
21% for a single mother making 10,000 francs a month (see table 2).  
  It may be reasonable to assume that women with higher educational attainment have 
higher expected earnings than those with lower education. If this is the case, then we 
would expect the reform to affect more strongly those women with lower educational 
attainment (and therefore lower expected wages). In order to verify the differential 
effects of the reform by education level, Probits are run separately for women with 
different levels of education (see table 8). The results show that the employment rate of 
low-educated single mothers affected by the reform increased significantly after 1998 
(by about 9 percentage points, relative to married mothers in the comparison group), 
while this was not the case for more highly educated single moms.
43 
  It was mentioned in section 3 that the effect of the reforms might vary with the 
number of the children because of differences in the fixed costs of working. Thus 
regressions are estimated that interact the dummies that measure the effect of the reform 
with the number of children. It turns out that the increase in employment is higher for 
single mothers with more children. Single mothers affected by the reform with more 
than two children experienced an increase in employment rates that was significantly 
higher than the increase for single mothers in the comparison group. This is probably 
because the pre-reform employment rates were much lower for single mothers with 
more children. 
                                                 
43 I run the regressions separately for women with and without an university education, and also for 
women with and without a high school degree. 20
  Additional robustness checks include variations of the regressions that also include 
interactions between the year dummies and number of children, between the year 
dummies and presence of a child under the age of 3, and between number of children 
and presence of children under the age of 3. These are not reported as the baseline 
specification because the additional interaction terms are not significant. The results 
seem quite robust to all the different specifications. The Probits are also run separately 
by age group, showing that most of the effect comes from younger women (aged 45 or 
less). 
  We may also wonder whether the effect of the reform took place through increases 
in part-time versus full-time employment. Thus I run a set of multinomial logits where 
the dependent variable takes three possible values: out of work, part-time work, and 
full-time work.
44 The results suggest that single mothers affected by the reform were 
significantly more likely to work full-time after the reform (relative to married mothers 
in the comparison group), while there was no significant differential increase in part-
time work. 
  The baseline specification estimated the effect of the reform, four years after its 
implementation. We may be interested in knowing more about the specific timing of the 
effect. Thus I run regressions that include different numbers of post-reform years. In 
1999, the first year of implementation, the employment and activity rates of treated 
single mothers did not increase significantly above single or married mothers in the 
comparison groups. Two years after the reform, the employment rate of affected single 
moms had increased significantly in absolute terms, but not relative to the comparison 
groups.
45 Three years after, the increase in employment for the treated group was still 
                                                 
44 Regression results are available upon request. I have also run ordered probits for the same outcome 
variable. 
45 The increase relative to single mothers in the comparison group was 2.4, while the differential increase 
relative to married mother was 6.7 points. 21
not significantly higher than for the comparison groups.
46 Thus our estimated “upper 
bound” on the effect of the reform was not significantly higher than zero until the fourth 
post-reform year, while the “lower bound” is never significant. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the effect of the 1998 reform of the French single parents allowance 
(API) on the labor supply of single mothers. The reform was aimed at encouraging 
participation, and introduced a temporary earnings top-up schedule that increased 
income for benefit recipients who took up paid employment.  
  Using data from the French Employment Survey, I estimate regressions for both 
employment and activity rates, where the probability that a woman is employed (active) 
is a function of her personal characteristics, a set of year dummies, and a binary variable 
indicating the period after the reform was implemented. Dummies are also included for 
the different “groups” (treated versus comparison), and for the group dummies 
interacted with the dummy indicating after the reform. The data cover four years before 
and four years after the reform. 
  The employment rate of single mothers affected by the reform increased 
significantly in absolute terms between 1998 and 2002 (by 7 to 10 percentage points). In 
order to know what fraction of this increase can be attributed to the API reform, we 
need to know whether this increase was higher than for other women who were not 
affected by the reform. 
  A first comparison group is composed of single mothers eligible for API but who 
were not affected by the reform (either because their youngest child turned 3 or because 
they entered a new marriage or partnership before January 1999). Single mothers 
                                                 
46 Estimated lower bound of 2.4 points (with respect to other single mothers); estimated upper bound of 
7.2 points; none of them are significant. 22
affected by the reform experienced an increase in employment that was 4 to 6 points 
higher than the increase experienced by the comparison group four years after the 
reform, but this difference was not significant. There was also no significant difference 
in the evolution of activity rates for both groups of single mothers. However, this can 
only be interpreted as a lower bound on the effect of the API reform, since the same 
earnings top-up schedule was also introduced in the RMI benefit, quite common among 
single mothers not eligible for API. Moreover, the law that reformed the API and RMI 
also promoted active measures to help find employment for welfare recipients (thus 
including both API and RMI recipients). 
  Thus a second comparison group is introduced, composed of married mothers with 
children younger than 3 (less likely to be affected by the RMI reform). It turns out that 
single mothers affected by the API reform were 3 to 5 points more likely to participate 
in the labor market for years after the reform, relative to married mothers, while they 
were about 9 points more likely to work, and the different evolution of the employment 
rates was significant. 
In sum, the analysis suggests that the employment rate of eligible single mothers 
(those with children under age 3) had increased significantly four years after the reform. 
This increase was significant relative to married mothers in the comparison group. 
However, it was not significant relative to single mothers in the comparison group. The 
increase in employment rates seemed to take place through a rise in full time work, and 
it was driven by young, low-educated single mothers. 
The results thus provide some evidence that benefit schedules that provide financial 
incentives to work may have significant effects on getting single mothers back to work, 
even when they have very young children. This result is relevant in the light of previous 
research, which has suggested that paid employment is associated with higher 23
probabilities of exiting poverty.
47 However, it should also be weighed against recent 







                                                 
47 See van Leeuwen and Pannekoek (2002). 
48 See Ruhm (2004) and Gregg et al. (2005).   24
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Notes: French Employment Survey data. Single mothers between 18 and 55 years old, with 


























Table 1. Benefit Levels for Single Mothers Out of Paid Work in 1997 
  














Table 2. Benefit Entitlement for Single Mothers with Children Under 3, Five Earnings 
Levels, in 1997 francs. 
 
Table 2a) Before 1999. 
 
N. Children  Wage=3000 Wage=5000 Wage=6664 (SMIC) Wage=8000 Wage=10000 
1 1  217  0 0 0 0 
2 2  271  675 675 675 675 
3  3 325  1 539 1 539 1 539 1 539 
4  4 379  2 404 2 404 2 404 2 404 
5  5 433  3 433 3 268 3 268 3 268 
 
Table 2b) After 1999. 
 
N. Children Wage=3000 Wage=5000 Wage=6664 (SMIC)  Wage=8000 Wage=10000 
1  3 467  2 967 2 551 2 217 2 109 
2  4 521  4 021 3 605 3 271 2 973 
3  5 575  5 075 4 659 4 325 3 932 
4  6 629  6 129 5 713 5 379 4 892 
5  7 683  7 183 6 767 6 433 5 933 
 
Note: Assuming no other income. In francs per month. The following benefits are take into 
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Table 3. Benefit Entitlement for Single Mothers with No Children Under 3, Five 
Earnings Levels, in 1997 francs. 
 
Table 3a) Before 1999. 
N.Children Wage=3000 Wage=5000 Wage=6664(SMIC)Wage=8000 Wage=10000 
1 1230  460 114 0 0 
2 1950  1154 808 675 675 
3 2988  2571 2417 2417 2417 
4 3893  3476 3282 3282 3282 
5 4834  4381 4146 4146 4146 
 
Table 3b) After 1999. 
N.Children Wage=3000 Wage=5000 Wage=6664(SMIC)Wage=8000 Wage=10000 
1 2855  2355 1939 1803 1803 
2 3575  3075 2659 2500 2500 
3 4537  4037 3852 3852 3852 
4 5498  4998 4765 4765 4765 
5 6459  5959 5678 5678 5678 
 
Note: Assuming no other income and first year in employment. In francs per month. The 








  Table 4. Increase in Benefits if Working After the Reform 
 (first year of work, assuming earnings equal the minimum wage, monthly 
amounts, in 1997 francs) 
 
N.Children  Children under 3 No Children under 3 Difference  Diff. Adjusted by 
N. Children 
1 2551 1825 726 726 
2 2930 1852 1079 763 
3 3120 1435 1685 973 
4 3309 1483 1826 913 
5 3499 1532 1967 880 
 
Note: Numbers calculated using the minimum wage as the earnings level. The last column is 

















mothers Married  mothers 
Employment 0,369  (0,483)  0,346  (0,476)  0,542  (0,498) 
Activity 0,532  (0,499)  0,567  (0,496)  0,618  (0,486) 
After (dt) 0,900  (0,300)  0,070  (0,255)  0,479  (0,500) 
Age 31,2  (6,389)  31,1  (6,251)  31,7  (4,761) 
Age sq.  1013  (409)  1006  (404)  1027  (312) 
Age cubed  34188  (20506)  33793  (20423)  34020  (15808) 
Years education  13,4  (3,226)  12,9  (3,026)  14,2  (3,516) 
Vocational deg.  0,275  (0,447)  0,274  (0,446)  0,254  (0,435) 
High school deg.  0,231  (0,422)  0,154  (0,361)  0,338  (0,473) 
Univ. Deg.  0,056  (0,230)  0,054  (0,225)  0,133  (0,340) 
One Child  0,451  (0,498)  0,450  (0,498)  0,329  (0,470) 
Two children  0,285  (0,452)  0,290  (0,454)  0,365  (0,481) 
Three children  0,131  (0,338)  0,138  (0,345)  0,173  (0,379) 
4+ Children  0,080  (0,272)  0,083  (0,275)  0,079  (0,269) 
Child<3 0,752  (0,432)  0,707  (0,455)  0,702  (0,457) 
Child<6 0,910  (0,287)  0,933  (0,250)  0,920  (0,271) 
Never married  0,727  (0,446)  0,648  (0,478)  0,033  (0,178) 
Widowed 0,022  (0,146)  0,026  (0,159)  0,000  (0,020) 
City 0,483  (0,500)  0,457  (0,498)  0,367  (0,482) 
           
N  1928     1587     36018    
 
Note: “Treated” single mothers are women aged 18 to 55 who were single mothers and had a 
child under the age of 3 at the time of at least one interview that took place after January 
1999.”Untreated” single mothers are women aged 18 to 55 who were single mothers and had a 
child under the age of 3 at the time of an interview that took place before January 1999, but not 
after January 1999. Married mothers included in the comparison group are women aged 18 to 
55 who were married mothers with at least one child under the age of 3 at the time of one of the 
interviews (and did not qualify as a treated or untreated single mother in any of the interviews). 
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Table 6. Probits for Employment and Activity, Single Mothers, 1995-2002. 
 
   Employment  Activity 
   1     2     3     4    
Treated (dj)  -0,067  *  -0,094 ** -0,070  * -0,075 * 
  (0,040)  (0,044)  (0,041)  (0,045)  
After  (dt)  0,015  0,064  0,064  0,081  
  (0,053)  (0,067)  (0,057)  (0,071)  
Treated,  after  (djdt)  0,058  0,040  -0,047  -0,052  
  (0,066)  (0,071)  (0,071)  (0,075)  
Age  0,293 *** 0,300 *** 0,274 *** 0,279 *** 
  (0,076)  (0,076)  (0,078)  (0,079)  
Age2  -0,007 *** -0,008 *** -0,007 *** -0,007 *** 
  (0,002)  (0,002)  (0,002)  (0,002)  
Years  education  0,001  0,001  -0,005  -0,005  
  (0,004)  (0,004)  (0,004)  (0,004)  
Vocational  training  0,160 *** 0,162 *** 0,122 *** 0,122 *** 
  (0,023)  (0,023)  (0,022)  (0,022)  
High  school  diploma  0,349 *** 0,351 *** 0,268 *** 0,268 *** 
  (0,029)  (0,029)  (0,025)  (0,025)  
University  diploma  0,401 *** 0,399 *** 0,355 *** 0,354 *** 
  (0,047)  (0,047)  (0,030)  (0,030)  
1  child  -0,030  -0,029  0,066  0,065  
  (0,058)  (0,058)  (0,069)  (0,069)  
2  children  -0,185 *** -0,186 *** -0,130  *  -0,132  * 
  (0,052)  (0,052)  (0,071)  (0,071)  
3  children  -0,235 *** -0,236 *** -0,221 *** -0,222 *** 
  (0,042)  (0,042)  (0,072)  (0,072)  
More  than  3  children  -0,323 *** -0,324 *** -0,396 *** -0,398 *** 
  (0,023)  (0,023)  (0,058)  (0,058)  
1  child  <  3  -0,078 *** -0,071 *** -0,105 *** -0,108 *** 
  (0,024)  (0,025)  (0,025)  (0,025)  
More than 1 child < 3  -0,118  **  -0,113  *  -0,195  ***  -0,200  *** 
  (0,057)  (0,058)  (0,061)  (0,061)  
1  child  <  6  -0,045  -0,064  -0,073  -0,073  
  (0,050)  (0,051)  (0,056)  (0,057)  
2 children <6  -0,084    -0,100  *  -0,125  **  -0,126  ** 
  (0,052)  (0,051)  (0,063)  (0,064)  
More than 2 children < 6  -0,142  *  -0,153  **  -0,071    -0,069   
  (0,079)  (0,077)  (0,093)  (0,094)  
City  >  200,000  0,034 ** 0,036 ** 0,052 ***  0,052 *** 
  (0,017)  (0,017)  (0,018)  (0,018)  
Never  married  -0,038 * -0,039 * -0,037 * -0,037 * 
  (0,021)  (0,021)  (0,022)  (0,022)  
Widowed  0,012  0,012  -0,012  -0,013  
  (0,058)  (0,058)  (0,061)  (0,062)  
Year dummies?  N     Y     N     Y    
 
Note: The sample includes “treated” and “untreated” single mothers, i.e., all women aged 18 to 
55 who were single mothers and had a child under the age of 3 in at least on of the three 
interviews (Enquete Emploi 1995-2002). Sample size is 3,515. Marginal effects are shown. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. One asterisk indicates that a variable is significant at the 90% 
level, two indicate significance at the 95% level, and three, at the 99% level. Age cubed, 
although not reported, is also included in the regressions and always significant.   31
Table 7. Probits for Employment and Activity, 1995-2002. 
 
   Employment  Activity 
   1     2     3     4    
Treated (j=2)  -0,076  *  -0,061    -0,083 ** -0,062   
 (0,043)    (0,043)  (0,041)  (0,041)  
Single mothers (j=1)  -0,145  ***  -0,146 *** -0,001    -0,001   
 (0,015)    (0,015)  (0,014)  (0,014)  
After (dt)  -0,019  ***  -0,012  -0,026  ***  -0,023  ** 
 (0,006)    (0,011)  (0,006)  (0,011)  
Single mothers, after (d(j=1)dt) 0,046   0,046  0,099  **  0,089 * 
 (0,055)    (0,055)  (0,046)  (0,047)  
Treated, after (d(j=2)dt) 0,057    0,043  -0,052  -0,059  
 (0,069)    (0,069)  (0,041)  (0,068)  
Age 0,297  ***  0,296  ***  0,190  ***  0,189  *** 
 (0,034)    (0,034)    (0,030)    (0,030)   
Age2 -0,007  ***  -0,007  ***  -0,004  ***  -0,004  *** 
 (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,001)   
Years of education  0,010  ***  (0,010)  ***  0,009  ***  0,009  *** 
 (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,001)    (0,001)   
Vocational training  0,147  ***  0,147  ***  0,111  ***  0,111  *** 
 (0,007)    (0,007)    (0,007)    (0,007)   
High school diploma  0,272  ***  0,272  ***  0,219  ***  0,219  *** 
 (0,008)    (0,008)    (0,008)    (0,008)   
University diploma  0,296  ***  0,296  ***  0,240  ***  0,240  *** 
 (0,010)    (0,010)  (0,009)  (0,009)  
1 child  -0,045  **  -0,044 **  0,008    0,008   
 (0,022)    (0,022)  (0,022)  (0,022)  
2 children  -0,213  ***  -0,212 *** -0,199 *** -0,198 *** 
 (0,021)    (0,021)  (0,021)  (0,022)  
3 children  -0,362  ***  -0,361 *** -0,374 *** -0,373 *** 
 (0,018)    (0,018)  (0,022)  (0,022)  
More than 3 children  -0,468  ***  -0,467 *** -0,499 *** -0,498 *** 
 (0,012)    (0,012)  (0,019)  (0,019)  
1 child < 3  -0,060  ***  -0,063 *** -0,078 *** -0,082 *** 
 (0,007)    (0,007)  (0,007)  (0,007)  
More than 1 child < 3  -0,080  ***  -0,083 *** -0,119 *** -0,123 *** 
 (0,018)    (0,018)  (0,018)  (0,018)  
1 child < 6  -0,045  **  -0,041 ** -0,043 ** -0,037 ** 
 (0,018)    (0,018)  (0,017)  (0,018)  
2 children <6  -0,109  ***  -0,105 *** -0,111 *** -0,106 *** 
 (0,019)    (0,019)  (0,020)  (0,020)  
More than 2 children < 6  -0,147  ***  -0,145 *** -0,124 *** -0,120 *** 
 (0,027)    (0,027)  (0,028)  (0,028)  
City > 200,000  -0,028  ***  -0,028 *** -0,023 *** -0,023 *** 
 (0,006)    (0,006)  (0,006)  (0,006)  
Year dummies?  N     Y     N     Y    
 
Note: The sample includes “treated” and “untreated” single mothers (i.e., all women aged 18 to 
55 who were single mothers and had a child under the age of 3 in at least on of the three 
interviews), as well as married mothers who had a child under the age of 3 in at least one of the 
interviews (Enquete Emploi 1995-2002). Sample size is 39,533. Marginal effects are shown. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. One asterisk indicates that a variable is significant at the 90% 
level, two indicate significance at the 95% level, and three, at the 99% level. Age cubed, 





Table 8. Probits for Employment by Education Level, 1995-2002. 
 
   No univ. Educ.    No hs deg.     Hs deg.    
Treated (j=2)  -0,069     -0,052     -0,064    
  (0,044)  (0,046)  (0,078)  
Single mothers (j=1)  -0,148  *** -0,152  *** -0,083  ***
  (0,015)  (0,014)  (0,029)  
After  (dt)  -0,014  -0,018  -0,011  
  (0,012)  (0,152)  (0,014)  
Single mothers, after (d(j=1)dt)  0,043  0,014  0,247  **
  (0,057)  (0,059)  (0,060)  
Treated, after (d(j=2)dt)  0,054  0,074  -0,325  
   (0,071)    (0,079)    (0,210)    
N  34533     21657     17876    
 
Note: The sample includes “treated” and “untreated” single mothers (i.e., all women aged 18 to 
55 who were single mothers and had a child under the age of 3 in at least on of the three 
interviews), as well as married mothers who had a child under the age of 3 in at least one of the 
interviews (Enquete Emploi 1995-2002). Marginal effects are shown. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. One asterisk indicates that a variable is significant at the 90% level, two indicate 
significance at the 95% level, and three, at the 99% level. Controls include age, age squared, age 
cubed, dummies for number of children, child(ren) under 3 and under 6, a dummy for cities of 
more than 200,000 inhabs., number of years of education, and a dummy for vocational training. 
 